The Democracy-Forcing Constitution by Devins, Neal
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 6 
1999 
The Democracy-Forcing Constitution 
Neal Devins 
College of William and Mary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1999). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol97/iss6/34 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 





ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT. By Cass R. Sunstein. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 290. $29.95. 
During my freshman year in college, I was told not to judge a 
book by its cover. The book in question - Lolita; the cover sug­
gested something quite salacious. My professor explained that a 
soldier, who had purchased Lolita to work out some of the kinks of 
military life, found himself tossing the book out, proclaiming in dis­
gust "Literature!" Well, I cannot claim precisely the same reaction 
to Cass Sunstein's One Case at a Time1 (my expectations were 
lower than the soldier's). Nevertheless, for those expecting a lefty 
defense of judicial restraint, One Case at a Time is not your book. 
Rather, Sunstein very much wants the Supreme Court to play an 
active role in abortion, affirmative action, the right to die, and much 
more. But Sunstein's brand of activism is minimalist. Rather than 
look to the judiciary to settle these issues once and for all, Sunstein 
sees the Court as a "democracy forcing" facilitator, encouraging 
elected government and the people to engage in constructive con­
stitutional dialogues.2 
As rallying cries go, Sunstein's plea for judicial minimalism has 
broad appeal. After all, social conservatives still complain about 
judge-made rights and the left, smarting from several Rehnquist 
Court defeats, increasingly sees elected government as more apt to 
embrace their agenda than the judiciary. With both sides ready to 
jettison judicial activism, judicial minimalism seems an idea whose 
time has come. 
Indeed, as Sunstein tells it, his brand of minimalism has already 
arrived. Proclaiming minimalism "the most striking feature of 
American law in the 1990s" (p. xi), Sunstein argues that the Court is 
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and 
Mary. A.B. 1978, Georgetown; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. -Ed. Thanks to Akhil Amar, Alan 
Meese, John McGinnis, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments in reading a draft of 
this review. 
1. Cass Sunstein is the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of 
Chicago. 
2. For another treatment of how the Court ought to decide cases to promote democratic 
dialogue, see ROBERT BURT, THE CoNSTITUTION IN CoNFLicr (1992). 
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cautious about imposing its views on the rest of society, "pre­
fer[ring] to leave fundamental issues undecided" (p. x). In this way, 
Sunstein sees Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (and to a lesser extent 
Justice Anthony Kennedy) as part of a solid block of minimalist 
Justices (that also include Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Stevens).3 
By simultaneously embracing minimalism and treating it as a 
fait accompli, One Case at a Time's subtitle ought to be the more 
emphatic The King is Dead; Long Live the King!, not the drab Judi­
cial Minimalism on the Supreme Court. But drabness may well be 
the effect that Sunstein covets. By speaking in such a matter-of-fact 
tone, One Case at a Time suggests a bloodless revolution that has 
run its course. Put another way, Sunstein sees himself as the victor 
and One Case at a Time a retrospective manifesto that will explain 
the soundness of his victory. 
Remarkably, Sunstein accomplishes this feat with hardly a men­
tion of what many consider the classic minimalist tract, Alexander 
Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch. 4 According to Bickel, the 
Supreme Court ought to avoid debilitating conflicts with elected 
government by making use of the "passive virtues," that is, proce­
dural and jurisdictional delays that provide a "time lag between leg­
islation and adjudication."5 But for Sunstein, the question is not 
"when" the Court ought to resolve a constitutional dispute. The 
question, instead, is "how" the Court ought to make its voice heard. 
One Case at a Time's stated goal "is to identify and defend a distinc­
tive form of judicial decision-making" (p. ix). 
By focusing on "how" the Court ought to decide cases before it, 
Sunstein pays only lip service to those limits in judicial capacity that 
justify Court invocations of the "passive virtues." In this way, One 
Case at a Time pays insufficient attention to the reasons why the 
Supreme Court ought to craft minimalist opinions. Although 
Sunstein acknowledges several powerful reasons supporting judicial 
minimalism (inherent limits both in the Court's factfinding powers 
and the Court's ability to compel elected officials to implement po­
litically unpopular decisions), One Case at a Time largely overlooks 
these justifications. In this way, One Case at a Time is not at all 
hinged to some vision of the Court's institutional strengths and 
weaknesses. Instead, the focus of One Case at a Time is a delinea­
tion of how a minimalist Court would tackle those issues that have 
3. According to this account, the Justices most interested in "lay[ing] down clear, bright­
line rules" that will bind both the Court and elected officials are Justices Clarence Thomas 
and Antonin Scalia, as well Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See p. xiii. 
4. ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Sunstein acknowl­
edges that a mininialist Court might well make use of the "passive virtues." Pp. 5, 39-40. But 
Sunstein does not return to this theme in any meaningful way. 
5. BICKEL, supra note 4, at 116. 
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divided the nation during the 1990s - the right to die, affirmative 
action, government linedrawing on the basis of sex and sexual ori­
entation, and the relationship between the First Amendment and 
new technologies. It also advances the highly debatable proposition 
that minimalist decisionmaking, in fact, will improve the quality of 
constitutional discourse outside the courts (pp. 25-27). 
In this review, I will argue that inherent limits in judicial capac­
ity support a more expansive vision of judicial minimalism than the 
one articulated by Sunstein. In particular, certiorari denials and 
other "passive virtues" work hand-in-glove with Sunstein's brand of 
minimalism. Sunstein acknowledges this but does not seriously con­
sider how the constructive uses of the "passive virtues" will advance 
his project. In other words, Sunstein is too obsessed with the 
democracy-forcing nature of judicial review to see how his and 
Alexander Bickel's brand of minimalism complement each other. 
But the problem with One Case at a Time is not simply that it 
does not go far enough. In critical respects, Sunstein's brand of 
minimalism goes too far. By making democratic deliberation and 
not some theory of what the Constitution means the lodestar of his 
proposal, Sunstein never considers the possibility that the Supreme 
Court ought to speak to basic questions of values on matters that 
divide the nation. While it often makes sense to defer such deci­
sions, the Court should not put off such decisions forever. Whether 
the issue is abortion, affirmative action, or the death penalty, the 
Court's unique voice ought not to be muted simply because its 
members are appointed, not elected. Sunstein's brand of minimal­
ism, however, allows for "maximalist" decisionmaking in very lim­
ited circumstances - when such a decision would cement a 
preexisting societal consensus. 
Constitutional dialogues between the Court, elected govern­
ment, and the people go a long way towards making the Constitu­
tion more relevant and stable.6 For these dialogues to occur, the 
Court cannot simply engage in minimalist decisionmaking. Rather, 
there are times when the Court must shape political and popular 
discourse - just as there are times when the Court ought to be 
shaped by the world around it. Of course, the Court may some­
times opt to function as a facilitator of a dialogue between elected 
government and the people (as Sunstein proposes) or it may opt 
out of the controversy altogether (as Bickel suggests). But the 
Court's voice is simply too important to leave the basic questions of 
constitutional decisionmaking exclusively in the hands of demo­
cratic government. 
6. Along with Lou FISher, I have developed this point elsewhere. See Neal Devins & 
Louis F!Sher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83 (1998). See also 
infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text. 
· 
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In the end, Cass Sunstein's One Case at a Time is provocative, 
important, and helpful. But it is also incomplete. While the 
Supreme Court would do well to leave most fundamental questions 
undecided, Sunstein does not satisfactorily come to grips with the 
possibility that the Court ought to tackle some issues head on and 
duck some issues altogether. 
I. MINIMALISM, THE JUDICIAL ROLE, AND THE 
DEMOC RATIC P ROJECT 
Starting with Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court has been 
attacked for addressing issues not before it.7 No doubt, when the 
Court "seek[ s] to decide cases in a way that sets broad rules for the 
future and that also gives ambitious theoretical justifications for 
outcomes" (p. 9), the Court risks making costly mistakes. Witness, 
for example, the damage that both the Court and the nation suf­
fered as a result of the Lochner8 era, a period from 1905 to 1937 in 
which the Court infused laissez-faire economics into the due pro­
cess clause to strike down roughly two hundred social and economic 
laws.9 An enduring Depression made a mockery of the factual 
premise of Lochner's free market philosophy.10 By 1937, populist, 
political, and academic attacks against the Court prompted a full­
scale judicial retreat. 
How then to avoid such debacles? One Case at a Time suggests 
that Court decisionmaking should be both narrow and shallow. By 
narrow, Sunstein means that the Justices should only decide the 
case before them, saying nothing (if possible) about the range of 
cases that raise related issues (p. 10). By shallow, Sunstein calls for 
"incompletely theorized agreements," that is, decisional rules that 
do not establish basic principles so that "people who disagree on 
the deepest issues [can] converge" (p. 11). Needless to say, the de­
cisions of the Lochner Court were wide and deep. 
Narrow and shallow decisionmaking, then, is "likely to make ju­
dicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging" (p. 4). 
Correspondingly, perceiving that "[f]ar more progress might be 
made through an empirically informed constitutional law" (p. 255), 
7. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). For the classic critique of Marbury, see William Van Alstyne, A 
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. 
8. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
9. There is some reason to think that the Lochner era was not all bad. David Bernstein, 
for example, makes a fairly persuasive case that racial minorities were well served by "right 
to contract" decisionmaking that resulted in the invalidation, among other things, of restric· 
tive covenants. See David E. Bernstein, Phillip Sober Controlling Phillip Drunk: Buchanan 
v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 V AND. L. REv. 797 (1998). 
10. For a competing perspective, see Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Lib· 
erty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of Liberty, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forth· 
coming 1999). 
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judicial minimalism affords courts an opportunity to learn more 
about the consequences of different rules. "[U]nintended social 
consequences" (p. 120), including elected government resistance to 
Court decisionmaking, also suggest that the Court should look 
before it leaps. 
At this level, Sunstein's minimalism is highly pragmatic. For ex­
ample, when "the relevant facts are in flux and changing very rap­
idly, and the consequences of current developments are hard to 
foresee" (p. 174), the Court ought to exercise caution before invali­
dating regulating controls. For this reason, it is hard to disagree 
with Sunstein's call for minimalist review of the regulation of the 
Internet and other new communications technologies (pp. 194-201). 
Furthermore, lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Court 
must recognize that its power lies "in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's accept­
ance of the Judiciary."11 Otherwise, the Court risks both populist 
attacks on its legitimacy and elected government reprisals. 
Sunstein's minimalism goes well beyond the costs of judicial er­
ror, however. The "connection between judicial minimalism and 
democratic self-government" is Sunstein's "most important goal" 
(p. xiv). Specifically, perceiving deliberation about constitutional 
ideals as promoting "a democratic nation's highest aspirations" (p. 
xiv), Sunstein defends judicial minimalism above all on the grounds 
that it will catalyze democratic processes "rather than preempt 
democratic deliberation" (p. xiv). 
This brand of minimalism, however, is hardly a call for majority 
rule. Sunstein wants deliberation more than anything else. To ac­
complish this feat, the Court cannot simply stand on the sidelines, 
rubber-stamping elected government decisionmaking. Correspond­
ingly, while Sunstein acknowledges that a minimalist Court might 
use standing, ripeness, certiorari denials, and the like to steer clear 
of constitutional disputes, One Case at a Time does not consider the 
circumstances in which the "passive virtues" ought to be invoked. 
The name of the game is how Court decisions can spur elected offi­
cials and the people to deliberate over the Constitution's meaning, 
not whether the Court ought to steer clear of certain disputes. 
Words and deeds, not passivity, are essential to this lofty task. 
"Minimalist judges," according to this account, "are entirely willing 
to invalidate some laws . . [for] [m]ajoritarianism is itself a form of 
maximalism" (p. x). 
What is striking here is that Sunstein suggests that Supreme 
Court Justices should care more about encouraging democratic de­
liberation than correctly deciding the case before them. Under this 
11. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 {1992) {plurality opinion). 
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view, a minimalist Court may well invalidate governmental conduct 
that is constitutional in order to promote democratic deliberation. 
When it comes to affirmative action, for example, Sunstein com­
mends the Court for its occasional invalidation of such programs 
while, without blinking, offering a spirited defense of why such pro­
grams are constitutional (pp. 125-29). Moreover, noting that the 
arguments for and against affirmative action "have not received 
much in the way of a public airing until the last several years" (p. 
117), Sunstein applauds the Court for "helping to stimulate public 
processes" through its "complex, rule-free, highly particularistic 
opinions" (p. 118). Specifically, since neither proponents nor oppo­
nents of race preferences can count on the Court to behave in a 
predictable way, both sides of the affirmative action wars have in­
centives to participate in an ongoing conversation about the sound­
ness of preferences. For Sunstein, this Court-inspired discussion of 
affirmative action's underlying questions of policy and principle 
may well stem the "public backlash against affirmative action" (p. 
130). But even if this does not occur, Sunstein sees the judicial role 
as salutary, notwithstanding his belief that the constitutional attacks 
against affirmative action are unconvincing. 
Sunstein's discussion of affirmative action is revealing for other 
reasons. First, perceiving that "judicial signaling" can shape the 
content of "public discussion" (p. 131), Sunstein appears to em­
brace the view that Supreme Court decisions serve a vital educa­
tional function, offering lessons that inspire citizens to think 
seriously about constitutional issues.12 Second, by democratic de­
liberation, Sunstein does not mean direct democracy. In discussing 
the recent spate of citizen initiatives on affirmative action, Sunstein 
suggests an "unusually high degree of skepticism" by reviewing 
courts might be appropriate (p. 134). Warning of the danger of 
"we-they thinking" and fearful that "a careful assessment of facts 
and values" 'vill not dominate citizen balloting, Sunstein both de­
fends "the ordinary (and constitutionally central) filters of political 
representation" and suggests that "politically insulated groups" 
ought to sort out the actual effects of affirmative action.13 Third, 
Sunstein sees little value in stare decisis or other rule of law con­
straints. His call for nongeneralizable "fact-specific" decisionmak­
ing is directly at odds with the belief that "settl[ing] authoritatively 
what is to be done" is a critical function of law and, as such, the 
12. On this point, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Insti­
tution?, 67 N.Y. U. L. REv. 961 (1992); Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of 
Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1952). For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
13. Pp. 133-34. Apparently, elected officials would then act upon this information. The 
question of what role, if any, interest groups should play in affecting elected government 
decisionmaking is not addressed by Sunstein. For further discussion, see infra text accompa­
nying notes 68-69. 
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Supreme Court contributes to political stability through its interpre­
tations of the Constitution.14 
One Case at a Time, ultimately, is a paean for the Court to keep 
its options open - speaking out in ways that give neither side of an 
issue a complete victory. This is true even on matters where the 
Court should defer to reasonable legislative judgments. On 
physician-assisted suicide, for example, Sunstein argues that with 
"no palpable defect in the system of democratic deliberation" (p-. 
102), the Court should not "intrude into ongoing deliberative 
processes in circumstances in which reasonable people might differ" 
(p. 101). Rather, it ought to allow "diverse solutions in diverse 
states" (p.101). At the same time, however, Sunstein contends that 
the Court should assume that there is a constitutional right to physi­
cian-assisted suicide (pp. 93-94). Under this approach, the Court 
would serve as a czar of reasonableness, ensuring that the state has 
good reason to interfere with this hypothesized fundamental liberty 
interest.15 
The explanation for an ongoing judicial role here is that the is- , 
sue of physician-assisted suicide is highly contested and, as such, the 
circumstances warranting a maximalist (wide and deep) decision 
are not present. For Sunstein, wide and deep decisions cement a 
societal consensus and must therefore be "earned by both thought 
and experience."16 Democratic deliberation, in contrast, best oc­
curs in the shadow of uncertainty. Unless and until that uncertainty 
becomes irrelevant (because a consensus is reached), the prospect 
of active judicial review is a necessary component of Sunstein's 
minimalist creed. 
In advancing this argument, Sunstein goes out of his way to de­
pict the core of the current Court as minimalist. Indeed, his case 
studies focus on decisions that he deems minimalist and, hence, cor-
14. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta­
tion, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying 
notes 75-76. 
15. For Sunstein, the implementation of this model will be anything but disruptive, for 
there are several reasonable grounds for state "intrusions" of this hypothesized right. See pp. 
94-98. With that said, Sunstein seems to embrace a right to physician-assisted suicide under 
hopeless conditions. Pp. 88-90. 
16. P. 257. Sunstein provides little guidance on how much consensus is needed before the 
Court issues a maximalist opinion. Sunstein likewise says very little about how to measure 
societal consensus - opinion polls, elite opinion, whatever. Furthermore, in his discussion of 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), Sunstein endorses the Court's deep "conten­
tious" repudiation of the Vrrginia Military Institute's exclusion of women. See pp. 163-70. 
Qualifying his basic claim, Sunstein argues that "a deep understanding of a constitutional 
provision is nothing to lament when a variety of justices can converge on it (and we) have 
good reason to believe that it is right." P. 170. As to who the "we" are, Sunstein does not 
say. 
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rectly decided.17 For Justices (like Sandra Day O'Connor) who are 
sometimes described as willing participants in a conservative coun­
terrevolution, Sunstein suggests that their flag files elsewhere. One 
Case at a Time, in this way, is intended to help Court watchers (and 
even Justices?) understand both the Rehnquist Court's emerging 
legacy "and to defend its controversial way of proceeding as admi­
rably well suited to a number of issues on which the nation is cur­
rently in moral flux" (p. xiv). 
II. A KINDER, GENTLER MINIMALISM? 
One Case at a Time's call for narrow and shallow decision­
making is sound in critical respects. To start with, the factual as­
sumptions that underlie One Case at a Time are correct. Inherent 
limits in judicial factfinding suggest that courts are apt to be mis­
taken in their judgments. In part, courts cannot escape "the unfor­
tunate consequences of judicial ignorance of the social realities 
behind the issues with which they grapple."18 As Judge Richard 
Posner puts it: "The first thing the courts have to learn is how little 
they know."19 While better social science research can help solve 
this problem (assuming that there are answers to questions like 
"what is the cause of homosexuality?" or "do the costs of single sex 
education outweigh its benefits?"), courts nevertheless will be 
shackled by the temporal and reactive nature of litigation. Specifi­
cally, with judges and advocates relying on precedent-based legal 
arguments, courts simply cannot engage in thorough cost-benefit 
analysis.2° Courts are also hamstrung in that they decide cases at a 
17. While conceding that one must be "attuned to the Court's minimalist tendencies" to 
recognize that some of these decisions, in fact, are minimalist, Sunstein argues that the 
Rehnquist Court defines its mission narrowly. See p. xii. For example, while recognizing that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in the physician-assisted suicide decision (limiting 
the Court's power to create fundamental rights to "deeply rooted . . .  traditions and prac­
tices") is anything but minimalist, Sunstein claims that, upon closer inspection, five members 
of the Court adopted a minimalist approach. See pp. xii, 77 (discussing Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). But there is reason to question Sunstein's depiction of the 
Rehnquist Court's minimalist tendencies. On physician-assisted suicide, for example, Sun­
stein does not take into account that lower courts (or the Supreme Court in a subsequent 
decision) may be more attuned to the fact that five members of the Court signed onto the 
Rehnquist opinion. See Michael W. McConnell, Supreme Humility, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, 
at A14. For similar reasons, Rehnquist Court affirmative action decisions can be recalibrated 
into something quite maximalist. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62. Furthermore, by 
only considering a subset of the Court's decisionmaking, Sunstein does not consider arguably 
maximalist Rehnquist Court decisionmaking, including the Court's invalidation of the Reli­
gious Freedom Restoration Act, Brady handgun legislation, and 1996 line item veto legisla­
tion. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
18. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 13 N.Y . U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1998). 
19. Id. at 18. 
20. Cost-benefit review, of course, is one of the hallmarks of the administrative state. 
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F. R. 638 (1993) (requiring cost-benefit review of agency 
rulemaking). 
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moment in time so that a changed understanding of the underlying 
facts can only be corrected through a reversal.21 Moreover, 
notwithstanding amicus curiae filings, the Court often relies on the 
arguments made by the parties before it, and the parties before it 
frequently frame the issues that the Court will consider. Corre­
spondingly, the Court may "anchor" its decisionmaking on its per­
ceptions of whether the parties before it are sympathetic or not. 
Problems may arise, however, when different parties raising identi­
cal legal issues may appear more or less sympathetic and, as such, 
the Court's decision may well be tied to the accident of which plain­
tiff presents its case to the Court.22 
Beyond the Court's propensity to get the facts wrong, the risks 
of elected government reprisals to unpopular decisionmaking may 
well be too great to warrant wide and deep decisionmaking on 
highly contested issues. Consider, for example, Roe v. Wade.23 By 
grounding its decision in a woman's right to bodily integrity and 
prohibiting state regulation of abortion during the first trimester, 
Roe is an extraordinarily wide decision. Indeed, this was the 
Court's intent. Justice Harry Blackmun advanced his trimester test 
to forestall future government efforts to sidestep the decision and, 
in so doing, to settle the abortion controversy once and for all.24 
From 1973 to 1989, however, 306 abortion-restricting measures 
were passed by forty-eight states.25 In 1992, after twenty years of 
elected government resistance as well as the appointment of new 
Supreme Court Justices, the Court responded to these pressures 
and returned much of the decisionmaking power related to this di­
visive issue back to the states. For this reason, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, in December 1992, lambasted Roe for "prolong[ing] divi­
siveness and deferr[ing] stable settlement of the [abortion] issue" 
by short-circuiting early 1970s legislative reform efforts.26 
The political maelstrom that followed Roe, of course, is unique. 
Nevertheless, there are countless examples of elected government 
21. Correspondingly, judges must operate around "real time" constraints, that is, courts 
cannot defer decisions on the cases before them. In particular, rather than risk a backlog of 
cases, judges must do the best they can with the information that they have. 
22. For an overview treatment of anchoring and other behavioral economics topics, see 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 V AND. L. REv. 1499 (1998). 
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
24. See DA vm J. GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE Ri:mrr TO Pruv ACY AND TiiE 
MAKING OF Roe v. WADE 585-87 (1994). 
25. See NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 60-63 (1996). 
26. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1208 
(1992). For an argument that the states were unlikely to liberalize abortion rights, see David 
Garrow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court Nominee Doesn't 
Know About Roe, WASH. PoST, June 20, 1993, at C3. 
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attacking unpopular Supreme Court decisionmaking.27 Indeed, the 
historical record makes clear that the Court is hardly ever success­
ful "in blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on 
a major policy."28 Rather, the "policy views dominant on the Court 
are never long out of line with the policy views dominant among the 
lawmaking majorities of the United States."29 None of this is to 
suggest that court-ordered reform is a "hollow hope"30; it is to sug­
gest, however, that courts should look before they leap. 
Sunstein, in his brief discussion of Roe, echoes these themes. 
Depicting the post-Roe social upheaval as "destructive and unnec­
essary," he argues that the Court ought to have proceeded nar­
rowly, engaging "in a form of dialogue with the political process" 
(p. 114). The question remains: How does the Court proceed nar­
rowly? One Case at a Time answers this question by extolling the 
virtues of narrow and shallow decisionmaking. The possibility of 
steering clear of controversy altogether, by employing the "passive 
virtues," is not factored into the equation (at least not in a meaning­
ful way).31 Here, I think, Sunstein loses the forest for the trees. 
Warren Court efforts to eradicate racial segregation in the post­
Brown32 South highlight why it is that the Court must sometimes 
walk away from controversy. To begin with, the Court's decisions 
in Brown are extraordinarily shallow. Rather than require southern 
systems to take concrete steps to dismantle dual school systems, the 
Court recognized that "varied local problems" were best solved by 
"[s]chool authorities," that district court judges were best suited to 
examine "local conditions," and that delays associated with 
"problems related to administration" were to be expected.33 By 
recognizing that "some achievable remedial effectiveness may be 
sacrificed because of other social interests" and that "a limited rem­
edy [may be chosen] when a more effective one is too costly to 
27. For a sampling, see Lours FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, PoLmCAL DYNAMICS OF CoNSTI· 
TUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996). 
28. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279, 286 (1957). 
29. Id. at 285. For other treatments of this subject, see Lours FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUES (1988); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABoUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elec­
tions, 69 AM. PoL. ScI. REv. 795 (1975); Symposium, Elected Branch Influences in Constitu­
tional Decisionmaking, 56 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 1. 
30. RosENBERG, supra note 29. For critiques of Rosenberg, see generally, Neal Devins, 
Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1027 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and 
Social Reform, 102 YALE. L.J. 1763 (1993). 
31. Sunstein, for example, never explains how (if ever) a minimalist Court ought to em­
ploy the "passive virtues." 
32. See Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (unanimous decision). 
33. 349 U.S. at 299-300. 
May 1999] Judicial Minimalism 1981 
other interests,"34 the Justices sought to improve the acceptability 
of their decision by speaking in a single moderate voice. 
More striking, following its rulings in Brown, the Court steered 
clear of the school desegregation issue for a decade.35 Indeed, well 
aware of the "momentum of history" and the "deep feeling" people 
had about school segregation, the Court refused to hear a 1955 
challenge to Virginia's miscegenation law rather than risk "thwart­
ing or seriously handicapping" its decision in Brown and, with it, its 
institutional prestige.36 In particular, with critics of Brown warning 
that integrated schools would produce a "mongrelization" of the 
white race, the Justices were unwilling to place themselves "into the 
vortex of the present disquietude ... [and risk] the carrying-out of 
the Court's decree. "37 
By 1964, however, Congress and the White House - through 
the monumental 1964 Civil. Rights Act 38 - made clear that they 
were prepared to lend their institutional support to the dismantling 
of single-race schools. It was against this backdrop that the Warren 
Court finally returned to school desegregation, declaring in 1964 
that "the time for mere deliberate speed has run out."39 This paral­
lelism should come as no surprise. Unlike Brown, when judicial in­
tervention ran against the grain of majoritarian preferences, court­
ordered reform was now consistent with the initiatives taken by the 
elected branches. In 1967, with the principle of desegregation 
safely established, the Justices revisited the miscegenation question, 
unanimously striking down the Virginia statute.40 
The Court's ability to navigate desegregation (at least before 
forced busing, when judicial hubris overtook common sense) is 
truly remarkable. It reveals that the Court can pursue radical social 
change while taking into account inherent limits in its authority. 
What would have happened if the Court followed this course on 
34. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585, 599 (1983). Cass Sunstein 
clearly embraces this type of shallow decisionmaking. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leav­
ing Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. R:Ev. 4, 50-51 (1996). 
35. During this period, its only foray into school desegregation was Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1 (1958), a decision reprimanding Arkansas governor Orval Faubus for blocking school 
desegregation in Little Rock. But Cooper was all symbolism and no substance, for the 
Court's decision occurred the year after President Dwight Eisenhower sent federal troops 
into Little Rock to force compliance with the district court's order in the case. 
36. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: 
Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE LJ. 1423, 1476 & n.317 (1994) (quoting a Nov. 4, 
1955 memorandum from Justice Felix N. Frankfurter to the Conference). 
37. Id. For the classic defense of the Court's action, see BICKEL, supra note 4, at 174; for 
the classic critique, see Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 
73 HARv. L. R:Ev. 1, 34 (1959). 
38. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. 
(1994)). 
39. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). 
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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abortion, issuing a less ambitious decision in Roe and then steering 
clear of the controversy for several years? Would the acrimony that 
followed in Roe's wake have been moderated? Quite possibly. 
First, populist resistance to Roe, in part, is a by product of the deci­
sion's absolutist nature. A decision permitting rape victims to seek 
abortions and no more would have held open the possibility that 
the Court might well approve less draconian regulations. In so rul­
ing, the Court would have appeared less extreme and, as such, may 
not have galvanized pro-life interests. Second, a more ambiguous 
decision might well have spurred the pro-choice community into ac­
tion. Roe and its progeny, by assuring pro-choicers that they could 
not lose the benefits they had won, eliminated the demand for pro­
choice legislation. Otherwise, pro-choice and pro-life interests 
would have pursued abortion legislation in the shadow of constitu­
tional uncertainty. Over time, it is possible that some consensus 
would have emerged.41 
The lesson here is simple: Courts do not resolve contentious 
social questions once and for all in a single decision. Rather, Court 
decisionmaking ought to leave room for democratic deliberation, 
including populist resistance. Sunstein, as his criticism of Roe 
makes clear, understands this. Indeed, in some ways, this is the 
point of One Case at a Time. By not considering how it is that the 
"passive virtues" fit into this equation, however, a key element is 
missing from Sunstein's elaboration of how a minimalist Court 
should behave. Specifically, the "passive virtues" allow a minimal­
ist Court to take the long view. By seeing each decision (including 
a decision not to decide) as part of a broader mosaic, the Court can 
allow time for cultural norms to change and settle so that its deci­
sions can win wider acceptability.42 
Delay makes sense for other reasons. As Sunstein recognizes, 
Court decisionmaking ought to be minimalist, in part, because the 
Court will sometimes get the facts wrong. But limitations in the 
Court's factfinding may also warrant delaying strategies. This, I 
think, is particularly true in separation of powers decisionmaking.43 
41. There is reason to think that a narrow ruling in Roe would have had this effect. Fol­
lowing the Court's narrow decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey - reaffirming Roe while 
expanding state regulatory authority- a consensus of sorts has emerged. Most significantly, 
the pace of abortion-related legislation has slowed dramatically. States no longer pursue 
legislative initiatives outlawing abortion. Rather, notwithstanding the recent furor over par­
tial birth abortion, the focus of state action involves restrictions approved by the Court: wait­
ing periods, informed consent requirements, and parental notification. See DEVINS, supra 
note 25, at 73-74. 
42. Cultural norms, of course, may not change. As to whether the Court should risk 
political reprisals in such circumstances, see infra text accompanying notes 77-80. 
43. Sunstein limits his "applications" to speech, equality, and privacy cases. Since One 
Case at a Time advances a generalist model of Court decisionmaking, this purposeful narrow­
ing of focus is unfortunate. 
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Unlike most challenges to a congressional statute, the frequent in­
terplay between the branches can make the ultimate impact of a 
new rule quite unpredictable, just as the political accommodations 
between the branches can redefine or even undo the substantive 
impact.44 For this reason, certiorari denials, :findings of no ripeness, 
and the like are particularly appropriate in this context. Take the 
line-item veto. Will it be used by the President to threaten individ­
ual members of Congress simply to pursue executive pet projects? 
Or will it serve as a defensive mechanism to protect the President 
from "veto proof' continuing resolutions? In other words, will it 
transform the substantive quality of legislation in a significant way, 
and if so, in what direction? Moreover, will experience with the 
line-item veto affect the ultimate operation of this device? That is, 
will Congress and the White House recalibrate their budgetary poli­
cymaking against the backdrop of their experiences with the line­
item veto?45 
The independent counsel statute provides another example of 
this phenomenon. Ten years ago, in concluding that the statute was 
constitutional, the Court found that the Attorney General exercised 
meaningful control over independent counsel investigations and 
that, in any event, the statute did not undermine the President's 
ability to manage the executive branch.46 With the benefit of ten 
years hindsight, of course, these conclusions seem, well, suspect. 
Delay, as Alexander Bickel put it, has the advantage of allowing 
the "full political and historical context, the relationship between 
the Court and the representative institutions of government" to be 
made clearer.47 While delay may not always be practical or neces­
sary,48 a minimalist Court should see great advantage in delaying 
strategies. Sunstein very much embraces certain types of delaying 
strategies. His notion that Court decisionmaking ought to be nar­
row and shallow, that the Court's reasoning ought to be incom-
44. Mike Fitts and I develop this point in Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph 
of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modem Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitu­
tional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 367-68 (1997). 
45. The answer to these questions remains a mystery, for the Court - in a maximalist 
opinion - struck down the line-item veto statute before Congress and the White House had 
significant experience negotiating around it. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
46. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
47. See BICKEL, supra note 4, at 124. 
48. In the independent counsel case, for example, a lower court finding that the statute 
was unconstitutional, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), made it impractical for 
the Court to refuse to hear the case. Otherwise, the statute would have been effectively 
voided in the D.C. Circuit, the very circuit in which a three-judge panel appoints independent 
counsels. With that said, the Court could have issued (a la Sunstein) a narrower opinion, one 
that left open the question of whether the President's control of the executive branch might 
be undermined by the statute. Such a decision would have sent a cautionary note to zealous 
independent counsels, whereas Morrison is a green light for monomaniacal prosecutors to 
push the envelope as far as it will go. 
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pletely theorized, and that issues ought to be left undecided, in the 
end, is a rallying cry for delay. In this way, One Case at a Time 
sounds a similar theme to the Least Dangerous Branch. Neverthe­
less, Sunstein commits error by presenting a theory of minimalism 
that does not take into account the appropriate uses of the "pas­
sive " virtues. Rather, by limiting his project to merits-based deci­
sionmaking, One Case at a Time is anything but a plea for the 
judiciary to steer clear of the issues that divide the nation. As such, 
there is a hollowness to Sunstein's call for courts to recognize inher­
ent limits in their authority. Does it cloak his desire for courts to 
play an active role in shaping public policy, a desire grounded in 
judicial supremacy? Perhaps not.49 But, as the next part will show, 
there is very little in One Case at a Time to suggest otherwise. 
III. SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
The Constitution's text, its original intent, and intervening prac­
tice support three-branch interpretation.5° For this reason, as Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg observed, "[J]udges play an interdependent part in 
our democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine but ... they 
participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with 
the people as well."51 But how should judges participate in consti­
tutional dialogues with elected officials and the people? More pre­
cisely, should judges, as Sunstein suggests, encourage democratic 
deliberation through ambiguous, incompletely theorized opinions? 
No doubt, as the prior section underscores, inherent limits in the 
judicial role make it sensible for the Court (at least some of the 
time) to issue narrow and shallow decisions. But these are prag­
matic restraints, not driven by some grand theory of democracy­
forcing judicial review. As such, they apply in a sporadic, ad hoc 
manner, allowing the Court to issue "maximalist " decisions when 
the circumstances warrant it. Sunstein's call for across-the-board 
minimalism, on the other hand, is grounded in a normative vision 
- democracy-forcing judicial review. In assessing Sunstein's nor­
mative theory, two questions therefore remain: First, can the Court 
craft minimalist doctrine in such a way as to promote democratic 
deliberation? Second, if it can, should it? The answer to both ques­
tions, as this section will suggest, is no. 
The Court's power to alter the course of democratic delibera­
tion is premised on the belief that people pay attention to the Court 
49. In an article entitled Leaving Things Undecided, Sunstein spoke of the synergies be­
tween his and Bickel's work. "The project of the minimalist judge," wrote Sunstein, "is easily 
linked with the project of exemplifying the 'passive virtues,' a project that is associated with a 
court's refusal to assume jurisdiction." Sunstein, supra note 34, at 51. 
50. For a sketch of why this is so, see Devins & Fisher, supra note 6, at 85-90. 
51. Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 1198. 
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(not simply the holdings of cases but the Justices' reasoning as well). 
The sad truth, however, is that the public is generally unaware of 
Court decisionmaking.s2 Correspondingly, it may be that media -
outlets, although reporting the Court's decisions, do not see the 
Court as an agenda setter; that is, coverage of an issue (school de­
segregation, for example) is not tied to landmark Supreme Court 
decisionmaking (Brown). s3 More telling, it is unclear whether 
lawmakers pay much attention to court decisionmaking. Six years 
ago, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and Congress agreed that 
the Clerk of the Court ought to inform Congress of instances where 
the D.C. Circuit construed a congressional statute.s4 The reason for 
this reform: Congress was not paying attention to these decisions, 
some of which invalidated or severely constrained Congress's 
handiwork.ss 
When Congress does listen, moreover, it rarely considers the 
Court's reasoning. Instead, its focus is on whether the Court's deci­
sion stands as a roadblock to reform. Fact-specific, indeterminate, 
incompletely theorized minimalist decisionmaking does not stand 
as a roadblock to anything. Rather, members who support the re­
sult reached by the Court will treat minimalist decisionmaking as 
something quite maximalist while members who oppose the out­
come will characterize such decisions as inconsequential. In the 
end, when the Court leaves issues undecided, lawmakers will simply 
chart a course to the outcome they prefer. 
This is the lesson of · the Supreme Court's 1995 Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Penas6 decision. Insisting that federal, as well 
as state, affirmative action programs be "narrowly tailored" to 
serve a "compelling governmental interest,"S7 Adarand tightened 
the standards governing affirmative action. Rather than apply this 
standard, however, the Court sent the dispute back to the district 
court where it originated. More significantly, the Justices neither 
repudiated diversity-based affirmative action nor prohibited gov­
ernment from "acting in response" to "both the practice and linger­
ing effects of racial discrimination."ss In this way, Adarand is a 
52. See David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as National 
Policymaker, 5 LAW & PouCY Q. 405, 407 (1983) (citing studies). 
53. See ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 111-16. 
54. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, CoURTS AND CONGRESS 69-81 (1997). 
55. This experiment has "not caused any flurry of legislative action" perhaps because 
Congress is still not paying much attention. Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not be 
Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katya� 50 STAN. L. REv. 1825, 1828 (1998). 
56. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
57. 515 U.S. at 227. 
58. 515 U.S. at 237. See also Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the 
Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisionmaking, 37 WM. & 
MARYL. REv. 673 (1996) (criticizing Adarand for saying so little). 
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quintessentially minimalist opinion and, not surprisingly, Sunstein 
praises it for its shallowness (pp. 124, 130-32). 
But, by saying so little, Adarand leaves it to lawmakers to spin 
the decision to fit their needs. Inside the Washington, D.C. 
beltway, where affirmative action is entrenched, Adarand is of little 
consequence, if any at all. A vivid illustration of this reality oc­
curred in July 1995 when Senator Phil Gramm proposed eliminating 
set-asides for minorities and women in federal contracting.59 In de­
fending this measure, Gramm explained that "my amendment is 
written in total conformity with Adarand. . . . That is, if the court 
finds that a contractor was [personally] subject to discrimination, 
the court may provide a remedy with a set-aside .... "60 In sharp 
contrast, Senator Arlen Specter called attention to Adarand's rec­
ognition that the government may act in response to "both the 
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination."61 Along 
these lines, Senator Patty Murray countered Gramm's efforts by 
proposing that federal funds can only be used for "programs . . . 
completely consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
. .. Adarand. "62 In the end, the Murray amendment was approved 
by a lopsided eighty-four to thirteen vote and the Gramm amend­
ment was soundly defeated by a bipartisan sixty-one to thirty-six 
vote. 
By not placing meaningful constraints on elected officials, deci­
sions like Adarand suggest that minimalist decisionmaking may be 
a lot of smoke with very little fire. As such, the principal conse­
quence of minimalist decisionmaking may be the delegation of deci­
sionmaking authority away from the Supreme Court and to lower 
federal courts. For example, by recalibrating the Supreme Court's 
careful parsing of words in Adarand, some lower courts have con­
cluded that diversity-based preferences are unconstitutional. 63 
Along the same lines, because courts will constantly be filling in the 
gaps left by fact-specific rulings, minimalist decisionmaking forces 
courts to actively oversee elected government. Correspondingly, 
since lawmakers and regulators will not know what is and is not 
constitutional, courts will inevitably find themselves in the thick of 
the policymaking soup. Over time, of course, a societal consensus 
59. 141 CoNG. REc. Sl0,401 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
60. Id. at Sl0,408 (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
61. Id. at Sl0,409 (statement of Sen. Specter). 
62. Id. at Sl0,405 (statement of Sen. Murray). 
63. The most vivid example of this is Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (5th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). This, of course, begs the question of whether the 
Supreme Court has a responsibility to guide lower courts through clear standards, if not 
rules. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D )evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 
CoNN. L. REv. 961, 992-93 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 
401 n.6 (1985). 
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may be reached, prompting the Court to issue a maximalist deci­
sion.64 Until that time, however, courts are more apt to function as 
technocrats, speaking narrowly to the question before them, than 
they are to prompt constructive democratic discourse. 
But even if Court decisions shape democratic deliberation, there 
is reason to doubt that minimalist decisionmaking is, ultimately, 
more democracy-forcing than majoritarianism. After all, the 
Court's unqualified approval of governmental decisionmaking 
leaves it to lawmakers and the people to define for themselves the 
reaches and limits of constitutional protections. Consider, for ex­
ample, the willingness of democratic institutions to correct 
majoritarian decisionmaking. Starting with Thomas Jefferson's dec­
laration that the Alien and Sedition Acts, which criminalized 
speech critical of the government, were unconstitutional and that 
every person convicted under the · sedition law ought to be 
pardoned,65 presidents have countermanded majoritarian decision­
making. Andrew Jackson's veto of legislation rechartering the 
Bank of the United States, Ronald Reagan's refusal to sign legisla­
tion codifying the fairness doctrine, and Bill Clinton's repeal of 
anti-abortion regulations are examples of this phenomenon.66 Con­
gress, too, has expanded constitutional protections in the face of 
Supreme Court decisions curtailing individual rights, including leg­
islation limiting third-party searches of newspapers; legislation au­
thorizing disparate impact proofs in voting rights and employment 
discrimination legislation; legislation .authorizing the assignment of 
women to combat aircraft; legislation allowing federal employees, 
including members of the armed services, to wear an item of reli­
gious apparel on their clothing; and much, much more.67 Rather 
64. The Supreme Court may well prefer this state of affairs. For example, it can issue a 
shallow decision on affirmative action, gay rights, or states' rights. If a societal consensus 
supporting a deep decision emerges, the Court can treat its earlier decision as a wedge, that 
is, the Court can subsequently redescribe that precedent in maximalist terms. See Posner, 
supra note 18, at 9-10 (suggesting that some of the decisions that Sunstein describes as mini­
malist are, in fact, wedge decisions). On the other hand, if the Court later decides that it 
would be a mistake to issue a deep decision, its earlier decision can be treated as a shallow 
minimalist holding. An example of this phenomenon is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). When decided, Griswold seemed to speak more to the marital bedroom than, say, 
abortion rights. Today, of course, Griswold is often depicted as a maximalist decision. Judge 
Bork, for example, labeled Griswold as the embodiment of "unprincipled" judicial activism. 
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 hm. L.J. 1, 
9 (1971). 
65. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905, 907 
(noting that the effect of Jefferson's pardon was to nullify the statutes "as much as if the 
Supreme Court had held them unconstitutional"). 
66. See DEVINS, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing the bank veto), 35 (discussing the fairness 
veto), 115-18 (discussing the repeal of anti-abortion regulations, including abortion counsel­
ing and fetal tissue research). 
67. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 27, at 3 (discussing newsroom protections), 283-302 
(discussing employment), 322-33 (discussing women in the military); 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994) 
(addressing religious apparel in the military). 
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than view the Court's decision as the last word, elected officials, 
after engaging in constitutional interpretation, have chosen to limit 
themselves in ways that the Court would not limit them. 
Majoritarianism, therefore, cannot simply be dismissed as anti­
thetical to Sunstein's project of democracy-forcing constitutional 
deliberation. But even if minimalism is more democracy-forcing 
than majoritarianism, there is reason to doubt the Court's ability to 
conduct this enterprise in the real world. Consider, for example, 
the Court's recent decisions upholding state bans on physician­
assisted suicide.68 Sunstein applauds the democracy-forcing nature 
of these decisions, noting that the Justices, by suggesting that state 
authority may be limited but not specifying when this may be the 
case, created incentives for both sides of the debate to engage in 
democratic deliberation (pp. 93-99). Yet, since courts must give 
reasons for their holdings, an incompletely theorized minimalist de­
cision would still speak to the legitimacy of state regulations. In this 
way, minimalist decisionmaking would necessarily affect the con­
tent of democratic discourse, especially if the Court - in filling in 
the gaps of earlier decisions - finds itself a repeat player on an 
issue. 
Courts, moreover, may face an array of possible options and 
outcomes, each of which might be deemed minimalist. How then 
should courts choose between competing minimalist decisions? For 
example, as Mark Tushnet argues, a minimalist decision striking 
down the assisted suicide bans might have been more democracy­
forcing "by assuring that democratic consideration of the issue was 
not obstructed by inertia or other procedural impediments to pub­
lic, and particularly legislative, discussion."69 Along these lines, 
given the burden of inertia (which makes it more difficult to enact 
legislation than to defeat the enactment of legislation), a minimalist 
decision invalidating assisted suicide prohibitions would promote 
democratic deliberation if "right-to-life" interests (who support 
such laws) have substantially more political power than "choice-in­
dying" interests. Under this scenario, "choice-in-dying" interests, 
although lacking the power to compel serious legislative considera­
tion of their reform agenda, might be able to force legislative con­
sideration of their arguments if politically powerful "right-to-life" 
interests would have to overcome the burden of legislative inertia. 
The flip side of this coin, of course, is that a decision upholding 
assisted suicide prohibitions would foster democratic deliberation if 
68. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. G!Ucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997). 
69. Mark Tushnet, How to Deny a Constitutional Right: Reflections on the Assisted Sui­
cide Cases, 1 GREEN BAG 2o 55, 57 (1997). 
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"choice-in-dying" interests had more political power than "right-to­
life" interests. 
But can courts sort out which side of a divisive issue has more 
political power? Sometimes discrete and insular minorities, who 
have certain organizational advantages, have substantial political 
power.70 Also, in states with direct democracy procedures, political 
power may be defined by public opinion. Should courts take opin­
ion polls? And what happens if political power varies from state to 
state? Should courts opt for the solution that maximizes demo­
cratic deliberation in the majority of states? Or should it focus on 
the most populated states? Or should it care the most about states 
that it deems parochial? 
Sunstein does not suggest that courts should do any of these 
things. But he does reject the proposition that courts ought to defer 
to democratic processes, dubbing majoritarianism a form of max­
imalism (p. x). Apparently, Sunstein's preferred system is one in 
which judges make seat-of-the-pants calls about the political mar­
ketplace. On the one hand, "if the Court cannot identify malfunc­
tions in the system of deliberative democracy" and "if very 
reasonable people can [disagree]" (p. 76), courts should either 
"leave things undecided" or defer to "reasonable" political judg­
ments (p. 103). On the other hand, "the existence of political ine­
quality" (p. 103) or possible bias (pp. 133-34) supports more 
intrusive judicial review.71 The problem here, of course, is that 
judges' values and beliefs will play a large part in sorting out 
whether there are defects in the political marketplace.72 
Perhaps I am being unfair. Sunstein's claim is that minimalist 
decisionmaking promotes democratic deliberation, not that 
minimalism is perfect. That judges will have difficulty determining 
which side should win, among other things, should not overshadow 
the virtues of democracy-forcing minimalism. Courts are apt to 
make mistakes anyway. So a system which promotes democratic 
deliberation must be better than the alternatives. 
But this simply begs the question: Why democratic delibera­
tion? The answer does not come from the Constitution's text, the 
framers' intent, or tradition. Those sources, more than anything, 
speak of a system of checks and balances, with each branch assert­
ing its own powers and protecting its own prerogatives. More fun-
70. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 713, 728 
(1985) (discussing, among other things, the power of voting blocs). 
71. In this way, Sunstein's argument is reminiscent of John Hart Ely's classic defense of 
the nonminimalist Warren Court.in JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
72. Mark Tushnet condemns minimalism for this very reason, arguing that "minimalism 
asks judges to make precisely those judgments that its premiseO [that political judgments are 
best left to public discussion] assert[s] judges should not make." Tushnet, supra note 69, at 
60. 
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damentally, as a freestanding normative theory, minimalism is 
fl.awed. There are occasions where courts ought to speak about 
right and wrong on highly contested divisive social issues. 
Judges, thanks principally to life tenure, are less likely to be 
driven by political expediency than elected officials. Moreover, be­
cause courts must offer reasons for their decisions, judges are more 
apt to take seriously their responsibility in advancing logical coher­
ent arguments. In other words, just as courts have institutional 
weaknesses, they have institutional strengths.73 In particular, more 
than any other part of the government, courts are more apt Hto ap­
peal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations,"74 and 
"to be a voice of reason . . .  articulating and developing impersonal 
and durable principles."75 
Judges, of course, are not philosopher kings. But their willing­
ness to speak about principle can be salutary, even if the principles 
they identify are wrongheaded. No branch should be the final arbi­
ter of the Constitution's meaning. Rather, the Constitution is made 
more vibrant and, ultimately, more stable by a give and take pro­
cess. Just as the courts need elected government to implement their 
decisions, Congress and the White House need the courts, as well as 
each other. This is the logic of our system of checks and balances, 
that "the effectiveness of the whole depends on [each branch's] in­
volvement with one another . . .  even if it often is the sweaty inti­
macy of creatures locked in combat."76 
More specifically, by sometimes invoking high-sounding 
principles when striking down elected government action, courts 
are well positioned to validate governmental decisionmaking. 
Charles L. Black, Jr. has explained the way this works: "What a 
government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and forever, 
is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps 
humanly possible to stay within its powers . . . .  [T]he Court, through 
its history, has acted as the legitimator of government."77 In other 
words, by speaking about right and wrong, judges can perform their 
most important task - affirming and legitimating the actions of 
elected government. In contrast, ambiguous, fact-specific, minimal­
ist decisionmaking purposefully lacks moral force. As a result, a 
minimalist j udge cannot really validate governmental 
decisionmaking. 
73. Sunstein acknowledges this, although he concludes that, more than anything, judicial 
insulation makes "it less legitimate for judges to choose what to do in the face of factual 
uncertainty." P. 103. 
74. BICKEL, supra note 4, at 26 
75. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 
99 {1959). 
76. BICKEL, supra note 4, at 261. 
77. CliARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURTS 52 {1960). 
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Beyond these institutional advantages, there are other reasons 
that courts might sometimes issue wide and deep decisions. In par­
ticular, dialogues between the Court and elected officials must take 
context into account. A democracy-forcing decision assumes that 
the political marketplace can work. That, however, is not always 
the case. Sometimes, for example, elected officials need the Court 
to play a leadership role. Late 1960s voting rights decisions uphold­
ing congressional reforms gave cover to Southern officials willing to 
comply with the new policy but unwilling to take responsibility for 
it.78 In 1983, a logjam between Congress and the White House 
could only be broken by a Supreme Court declaration that racist 
private schools were not entitled to tax breaks.79 
Admittedly, there are risks in seeing the courts as fixers. Some­
times the courts may see a failure in the political marketplace that 
isn't really there; other times elected officials may find it expedient 
to punt their duties as constitutional interpreters. Nevertheless, 
there is a rigidity to democracy-forcing minimalism that seems at 
odds with our system of checks and balances. Dialogues between 
the branches are ongoing and require a certain amount of give and 
take, including contextual decisionmaking. 
None of this is to say that courts ought to be value-laden flame­
throwers. Inherent limits in the judicial function support delaying 
strategies, including minimalist decisionmaking.80 But courts 
should sometimes eschew incompletely theorized agreements and 
democracy-forcing strategies. If courts think segregation is morally 
repugnant or that life does (or does not) begin at conception, why 
favor a strategy that leaves it to democratic deliberation. Why not 
favor a strategy in which the Court - a coequal branch of govern­
ment - cares about outcomes as well as processes? After all, de­
mocracy will ultimately prevail. If elected government and the 
people disagree with the Court, they will countermand its 
decisionmaking. 81 
JV. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional decisionmaking is a never-ending process involv­
ing all parts of the government and the people as well. One Case at 
a Time, to its credit, recognizes that no part of government holds a 
monopoly over the Constitution. Moreover, in calling attention to 
inherent limits in judicial review, Sunstein rightly suggests that the 
Court ought to move incrementally, issuing narrow and shallow de-
78. See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 
84 Nw. U. L. R:Ev. 985, 1017 (1990). 
79. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
80. See sources cited supra notes 18-29. 
81. See sources cited supra notes 27-29. 
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c1s1ons. Nevertheless, One Case at a Time is incomplete. In some 
ways, it goes too far in discounting the virtues of judicial review, 
especially with regard to occasions when the judiciary should em­
brace some interpretive theory of what the Constitution means and 
thereby play a leadership role in the shaping of constitutional val­
ues. In other ways, it does not go far enough. In failing to detail 
how (and whether) a minimalist Court ought to make use of the 
"passive virtues," Sunstein never comes to terms with how the 
Court's institutional strengths and weaknesses should shape judicial 
review. 
One Case at a Time is incomplete for other reasons as well. 
Most striking, by hinging his theory of judicial minimalism on a 
handful of Rehnquist Court decisions, Sunstein opens himself to at­
tack on several fronts. First, if some of these decisions can be char­
acterized as maximalist (or if Rehnquist Court decisionmaking not 
considered by Sunstein can be characterized as maximalist), there is 
reason to question the verity and portability of his model. 82 Sec­
ond, even if his case analyses are sound, One Case at a Time relies 
on too few data points to be truly convincing. Rehnquist Court 
decisionmaking on affirmative action, physician-assisted suicide, 
and gender discrimination does not occur in a vacuum. These deci­
sions are part of a larger mosaic of cases and, as such, should be 
considered in this broader context.83 Third (and correspondingly), 
by focusing on 1990s decisionmaking, One Case at a Time is too 
temporal. What would Sunstein say about the maximalist decisions 
of the Warren Court? Did decisions on, say, reapportionment fos­
ter or impede democratic deliberation? Moreover, given Sunstein's 
left-leaning politics, his efforts at depicting the right-leaning 
Rehnquist Court as minimalist invites suspicion. Specifically, is 
Sunstein's objective to prevent the Rehnquist Court from going too 
far or is One Case at a Time a book for the ages (one that would 
condemn the maximalist decisionmaking of the Warren Court)? 
When all is said and done, One Case at a Time has the vices and 
virtues of a tactician's effort to solve a problem before him. By 
giving short shrift both to institutional and interpretive theories of 
judicial review,84 Sunstein's defense of judicial minimalism is less 
82. Some of Sunstein's case analyses (including his choice of case studies) can be chal­
lenged on these grounds. See supra notes 16-17, 43-45. 
83. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (depicting Brown and its progeny as 
part of a larger mosaic). 
84. Unlike Bickel, who linked his call for the "passive virtues" with a desire for the Court 
to ground their decisionmaking (in those cases where they did speak) in interpretive theories, 
Sunstein strongly opposes any delineation of transcendent "neutral principles." Conse­
quently, where Bickel was criticized for "100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time," 
Sunstein seems to ask for 0% principle 100% of the time. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle 
Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 
64 CoLUM. L. REv. l, 3 (1964). 
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than convincing. Too many questions are left unanswered and, as 
such, Sunstein's argument seems, well, too incompletely theorized. 
To his credit, however, Sunstein pulls off a near-impossible feat. At 
a time when both the left and right call for a diminishing judicial 
role, Sunstein somehow manages to chart a "consensus" course for 
active judicial review. Calling attention to the inherent limits of ju­
dicial review, Sunstein's plea for narrow, shallow decisionmaking 
appeals to conservatives who prefer cost-benefit analysis to values­
based decisionmaking.8 5 But Sunstein also appeals to the senti­
ments that made the left like activist judicial review in the first 
place. He contends, for example, that minimalist review will be of 
particular use to underrepresented groups and that minimalist re­
view compels lawmakers to justify the reasonableness of their 
decisionmaking. 8 6 
Ultimately, One Case at a Time may be understood as a neces­
sary complement to Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous 
Branch. In particular, by calling attention to how it is that narrow 
and shallow decisionmaking operates as a delaying strategy, 
Sunstein makes clear that democratic decisionmaking and judicial 
review can complement each other. That Sunstein's call for 
democracy-forcing judicial review is a nonstarter does not cast 
doubt on this achievement. In other words, while the particulars of 
One Case at a Time may not stand the test of time, Sunstein's call 
for narrow and shallow decisionmaking may prove a critical (if in­
complete) bridge between the "passive virtues" and active judicial 
review. 
85. See Posner, supra note 18, at 9 (describing his approach as "similar" to that of 
Sunstein). 
86. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
